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The United States Sentencing Guidelines have set forth the system
by which tax offenders are punished for violating the federal
income tax laws. This Article explores the various methods that
the appellate courts have used to define "tax loss" under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines for purposes of sentencing
enhancement for tax related offenses. It discusses the concept of
"tax loss" for federal sentencing purposes, including the guideline
provisions that drive the tax offender's offense level and ultimate
guideline imprisonment range. It explores major circuit decisions
which interpreted the proper implementation of the guideline
sentencing factors. Finally, it examines issues that remain
unresolved and critiques some of the positions and methods that
the reviewing courts have taken with respect to issues discussed in
this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 19841, which
revamped the federal sentencing system in the United States. As part of this change
of law, Congress established the United States Sentencing Commission2 and
charged it with creating and disseminating a compilation of binding sentencing
guidelines for use in the federal criminal justice system.3 The Commission is free
to amend any provision of the guidelines, but Congress must approve each new
guideline provision before it may take effect.4 These guidelines have the same
weight and have the same force and effect as rules and regulations promulgated by
federal agencies. 5
The United States Sentencing Guidelines contain nineteen separate
categories of offense behavior, each having several subclasses within them.6
Offenses involving taxation are found at Chapter Two, Part T ("Offenses Involving
Taxation"), which contains ten separate subcategories of tax-related offenses.'
Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984).
2 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1997).
' 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1997). See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A intro.
comment (1998). "The [Sentencing Reform Act of 1984] delegates broad authority to the
[Sentencing] Commission to review and rationalize the federal sentencing process." Id.
4
1d.
5 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45, (1993).
6 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 2 (1998) "Chapter Two pertains to offense

conduct. The chapter is organized by offenses and divided into parts and related sections
that may cover one statute or many. Each offense has a corresponding base offense level
and may have one or more specific offense characteristics that adjust the offense -level
upward or downward." Id.
7 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T (1998), et. seq. The tax guidelines
are
categorized into three main areas.: offenses involving income, employment, estate, gift, and
excise taxes; alcohol and tobacco taxes; and customs taxes. Specifically, these categories
have ten individual offense guidelines as follows: U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§2T1 .1 (1998) (Tax Evasion; Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information or Pay Tax;
Fraudulent or False Returns, Statements or Other Documents); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §2T1.4 (1998) (Aiding, Assisting, Procuring, Counseling, or Advising

Tax Fraud); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2T1.6 (1997) (Failing to Collect or
Truthfully Account for and Pay Over Tax); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§2T1.7 (1997) (Failing to Deposit Collected Taxes in Trust Account as Required After
Notice); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.8 (1998) (Offenses Relating
to Withholding Statements); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.9
(1998) (Conspiracy to Impede, Impair, Obstruct, or Defeat Tax); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T2.1 (1998) (Non-Payment of [Alcohol and Tobacco] Taxes);
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The Sentencing Commission defined the overriding goals and objectives
in its introductory commentary to this guideline:
The criminal tax laws are designed to protect the public interest in
preserving the integrity of the nation's tax system. Criminal tax
prosecutions serve to punish the violator and promote respect for
the tax laws. Because of the limited number of criminal tax
prosecutions relative to the estimated incidence of such violations,
deterring others from violating the tax laws is a primary
consideration underlying these guidelines. Recognition that the
sentence for a criminal tax case will be commensurate with the
gravity of the offense should act as a deterrent to would-be
violators.8
The Sentencing Commission set forth its goals in the policy statement. Moreover,
it lists several application instructions for courts to follow when applying the
guidelines to a particular offense, including the method for selecting the applicable
guideline, 9 the base offense level and offense characteristic enhancements, 10 other
adjustments for victim, role, and obstruction of justice," and criminal history. 2
Notwithstanding these mandates and the care the Commission used when
drafting the guidelines,13 and notwithstanding the additional guidance it provided
through commentary and application notes to the various individual guideline
sections, several questions remain as to the proper application of the tax guidelines
to specific offenses. For example, how should a sentencing court interpret "tax
loss" for purposes of determining the offense level? May it consider collateral

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2T2.2 (1998) (Regulatory Offenses); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T3.1 (1998) (Evading Import Duties or
Restrictions (Smuggling); Receiving or Trafficking in Smuggled Property).
8 U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL intro, comment § 2Tl.1 (1998). This
introductory comment became effective on November 1, 1987 and, to date, has not been
revised.

THOMAS

W.

HUTCHINSON, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE, at

675

(1998).
9U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.l(a) (1998).
'0 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.l(b) (1998).
"U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.l(c) (1998).
' 2 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1Bl.l(f) (1998).
The Sentencing Commission attempted to incorporate as many possibilities and situations
as possible by examining the data and conducting statistical analyses of over 40,000
convictions. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lA5 (1998). "The
Commission emphasizes that it drafted the initial guidelines with considerable caution." Id.
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state, local, foreign, or any other non-federal tax loss in the computations? Does
the statute of limitations that otherwise cuts off the ability for the government to
prosecute a particular taxable year not apply when determining tax-loss for purposes
of sentencing enhancement?
This Article examines these and other issues and explores the various
methods that the appellate courts have used to define "tax loss" under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines for purposes of sentencing enhancement for taxrelated offenses. It discusses the concept of "tax loss" for federal sentencing
purposes, including the guideline provisions that drive the tax offender's offense
level and ultimate guideline imprisonment range. It explores major circuit
decisions which address certain ambiguous provisions in the tax section of the
Guidelines. Finally, it examines issues that remain unresolved and critiques some
of the positions and methods that the reviewing courts have taken with respect to
issues discussed in this article.
II. TAX Loss

A. Guideline Definitions
The Sentencing Guidelines employ the concept of "tax loss" as the
foundation for deciding the proper sentence for tax fraud and related revenue laws.14
As a starting point, most of the tax guidelines call for the determination of the base
offense level by referring to the Tax Table found at U.S.S.G. section 2T4.1,"5
referencing the appropriate tax loss. 16 The Tax Table ranges from $1,700 or less

14

United States v. Harvey, 996 F.2d 919 (7th Cir. 1993). See also U.S. SENTENCING

GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1. 1 (1997), comment (backg'd).
"This guideline relies most heavily on the amount of loss that was the
object of the offense. Tax offenses, in and of themselves, are serious
offenses; however, a greater tax loss is obviously more harmful to the
treasury and more serious than a smaller one with otherwise similar
characteristics. Furthermore, as the potential benefit from the offense
increases, the sanction necessary to deter also increases."
Id.
5
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T4.1 (1998).

The following tax guidelines utilize the Tax Table found at U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T4.1 (1998) as the method for setting the base offense level,
provided a "tax loss" exists: U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1 (1998)
16

(Income Taxes, Employment Taxes, Estate Taxes, Gift Taxes, and Excise Taxes (Other
Than Alcohol, Tobacco, and Customs Taxes)); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2T1.4 (1998) (Aiding, Assisting, Procuring, Counseling, or Advising Tax
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(calling for a base offense level of six) to more than $80,000,000, (calling for a base
offense level of twenty-six). For a first time offender with no criminal history,
these offense levels may translate into sentences ranging from probation on the lowend to six years incarceration on the high-end.
The Tax Table alone does not explain how a sentencing court determines
the appropriate loss figure. However, U.S.S.G. § 2Tl.1(c) provides the basic
mechanisms for the courts to follow when making these determinations.

The majority of tax offenses stem from violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7201
(false statement on tax returns), the guideline for which is found at U.S.S.G §
2Tl1. 7 As such, a plethora of case law and disputes have arisen over issues
surrounding it. Although there is substantial overlap among all of the guidelines,
especially those that are "loss driven," 18 this Article will focus primarily on
U.S.S.G.§ 2Tl.1.
First, the guidelines direct that "tax loss" may be determined by computing
28% of the unreported gross income or improper claim of deduction 19 or exemption
(34% if the defendant is a corporation). 20 In addition, if any false tax credits 21 were

Fraud); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.6 (1998) (Failing to Collect
or Truthfully Account for and Pay Over Tax); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2T1.7 (1998) (Failing to Deposit Collected Taxes in Trust Account as
Required After Notice); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.9 (1998)
(Conspiracy to Impede, Impair, Obstruct, or Defeat Tax); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T2.1 (1998) (Non-Payment of Taxes); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T3.1 (1998) (Evading Import Duties or Restrictions
(Smuggling); Receiving or Trafficking in Smuggled Property).
17 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL App. A (1998) (Statutory Index).
18 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.l(b)(1) (1998) (Loss
table increasing offense level for offenses involving larceny, embezzlement, theft, and
receipt of stolen property); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (b)(1)
(1998) (Loss table increasing offense level for offenses involving fraud, deceit, forgery, and
counterfeit instruments); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S 1. (b)(2)
(1998) (Loss table for offenses involving laundering monetary instruments).
19 A tax "deduction" "reduces the amount of taxable income." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Tl.l (1998), comment. (n. 5).
20 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Tl.1(c)(1)(A),(B) (1998). "Gross
income" is defined as
"all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited to)
the following items: compensation for services, including fees,
commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items; gross income derived
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claimed as part of the offense, that entire amount will be added to the "tax loss"
figure.22 If the offense involved the failure to file a tax return (with a consequential
loss to the government), a failure to pay tax, or a fraudulent claim for a tax refund,
the "tax loss" is the respective amount that the defendant failed to pay.23
Second, contrary to the heightened burden of proof which normally
operates in a criminal case for purposes of achieving a criminal conviction or
suppressing evidence, for sentencing purposes, the government need only prove the
conduct supporting the loss figure by a preponderance of the evidence. Also
contrary to trial or other law and motion proceedings, information concerning any
sentencing factor is admissible, even if it violates the Federal Rules of Evidence.
"In resolving any dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing
determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its
admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the
24
information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. ,
Provided that the sentencing court's conclusions are supported by a preponderance
of the evidence, the reviewing court must affirm the decision below.25
from business; gains derived from dealings in property; interest; rents;
royalties; dividends; alimony and separate maintenance payments;
annuities; income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
pensions; income from discharge of indebtedness; distributive share of
.partnership gross income; income in respect of a decedent; and income
from an interest in an estate or trust."
26 U.S.C. § 61(a).
21A "credit claimed against tax" "reduces the amount of tax directly." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
MANUAL §2T1.I, comment. (n.5) (1998).
22
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2TI.I(c)(1)(A),(B) (1998).
23 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §'2T1.1(c)(3), (4) (1998).
24 U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3, p.s. (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 3661
(emphasis added). This practice carries forward from the pre-guidelines era. However,

many factors that ordinarily would not automatically have had a direct bearing on the length
or type of sentence during the pre-guidelines era (such as evidence of criminal history and
other offense conduct or behavior) is no longer the case under sentencing guidelines. Id.,
at § 6A1.3, comment (1998).
25

United States v. Whitson, 125 F. 3d 1071, 1074 (7Th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopson,

18 F. 3d 465, 467 (7"h Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1243 (1994); United States v.

Chandler, 12 F. 3d 1427, 1434 (7' Cir. 1994). See also Witte v. United States, 515 U.S.
389,399-401 (1995); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,747-48 (1994); United States
v. Petty, 982 F. 2d 1365, 1367 (9" Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1040 (1994) (stating

that hearsay evidence may be considered at sentencing hearing, provided it contains
sufficient indicia of reliability), accord,United States v. Sciarrino, 884 F. 2d 95, 97 (3d Cir.
1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 997 (1989). See also, United States v. Mclver, 186 F.3d 1119
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It is important to note that the government is not required to show that it
actually suffered a loss of these respective amounts in tax. 26 Similarly, once the
offense is committed (such as the commission of a false statement on a tax return
or the failure to withhold and submit tax by the due date), the tax loss will not be
reduced by a subsequent payment of the unreported or evaded tax.
For example, in UnitedStates v. Tandon,27 a Cleveland, Ohio physician was
convicted of multiple counts of willfully filing false personal income tax returns
and one count of aiding and assisting in the filing of a false corporate income tax
When sentencing the defendant, the court included the amount of tax that
return .28
the defendant willfully failed to report on the tax years in question. The court did
not reduce the tax loss by the amounts the defendant subsequently paid to the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for two of the tax years at issue, but prior to the date
of conviction and sentencing. The defendant argued that the court should have
offset the tax loss figure by the total amount of money that he paid to the IRS. This
adjustment, the defendant noted, would result in a tax
loss figure that includes only
29
the total amount of actual harm to the government.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. The proper measure of harm
to the government necessarily includes the "amount by which the income was
understated on the false tax returns and not on whether the government ultimately
lost money. 30 To find otherwise would permit offenders to reduce the severity of
their sentences by remitting payment to the government once it uncovers the
commission of the crime. Such an approach violates the very notion fundamental
to American jurisprudence--criminals, by virtue of their wealth and financial
position, should not be in any better position to avoid a criminal conviction or
lessen the impact of their sentences than one who lacks money.
As noted above, sentencing courts have taken the position that "tax loss"
may not be reduced by amounts subsequently paid to the IRS. This position is fair,
reasonable, and consistent with the rules concerning loss in other sections of the
Sentencing Guidelines.

(9 th Cir. 1999)(explaining that evidence suppressed at trial may be used for purposes of
determining sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines).ht
26 See United States v. Noske, 117 F. 3d 1053, 1060 (8 Cir. 1997).
27 111 F. 3d 482 (6th Cir. 1997).
28 Id. at 484.
29
Id.at 490.
30

d.
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The government may use the percentage method of approximating the loss
and, therefore, approximate the level of criminal culpability. But, in all of these
situations, if a "more accurate determination of the tax loss can be made" that
method will prevail over the guideline defined methods. 3'
The rules for determining "tax loss" for criminal culpability purposes are
not necessarily the same for those used to determine civil liability under the
regulatory statute.32 The Guidelines focus on other methods and mechanisms for
extrapolating information independent of the various civil statutes and regulations
establishing measures of tax liability.
B. "ReasonableEstimate" Method
There may be instances where it is not possible or reasonable to use the
percentage of income evaded in order to reach a just and fair tax loss figure.
However, under such circumstances, the district court is not bound to use any of the
methods discussed above. In such situations, the guidelines permit the court to
make a "reasonable estimate" of the tax loss. 33 The guidelines thus empower the
district court with broad latitude in order to arrive at the proper harm caused by the
defendant's activities.
However, it should be noted that the authority for establishing this
"reasonable estimate" method for determining tax loss has been called into question
by at least one commentator who was critical of the Sentencing Commission

31U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 2TI.I(c)(1)(B) (1998).
32 See United States v. Furkin, 119 F. 3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1997).
33"In some instances, such as when indirect methods of proof are used, the amount of the
tax loss may be uncertain; the guidelines contemplate that the court will simply make a
reasonable estimate based on the available facts." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2Tl.1, comment. (n. 1) (1998). This approach is consistent with the spirit of
the application of loss for all sections of the Sentencing Guidelines. See also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1, comment. (n. 8) (1998)
For generic fraud and deceit cases, .....
loss need not be determined with
precision. The court need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss,
given the available information. This estimate, for example, may be
based on the approximate number of victims and an estimate of the
average loss to each victim, or on more general factors, such as the nature
and duration of the fraud and the revenues generated by similar
operations."
Id. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 128 F. 3d 74 (2nd Cir. 1997).
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establishing evidentiary standards for the court to follow. 34 Nonetheless, courts
throughout the country have endorsed and followed the "reasonable estimate"
method.35
Given that the sentencing process in tax cases may become quite time
consuming, complex, and unduly burdensome upon the court, it seems that the
"reasonable estimate" method is a fair attempt by the Sentencing Commission to
give the district court the ability to achieve some sense of balance and fairness to
follow when fashioning a proper sentence. The "reasonable estimate" standard has
not been tested by the appellate courts, so whether it passes constitutional muster
has yet to be addressed. No matter what method the court ultimately employs, a
reviewing court will be very deferential to the district court's often fact-based
decision as to which permissible method.36
C. Relevant Conduct
1. Overview of Relevant Conduct Generally
One of the most controversial aspects of the Sentencing Guidelines involves
the use of conduct outside the scope of the count or counts of conviction for
purposes of sentence enhancement. 37 Regardless of whether an individual

34 T. HUTCHISON, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE,

at 589 (West 1997). "The
[Sentencing] Commission...has no authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994 to establish evidentiary
standards; it is for the courts to determine what proof will suffice to establish various facts
underlying application of the guidelines." Id.
35See, e.g., Bryant, 128 F. 3d at 76 (explaining that the court saw "no reason why [the
methodology of engaging in estimates or extrapolations for determining loss in a theft case
as discussed at U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1, comment. (n. 8)
(1998) or at U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1, comment. (n. 2)
(1998)]
may not be used in a [tax case.]")
36
See, e.g., United States v. Valenti, 121 F. 3d 327, 334 (7t' Cir. 1997) (holding that district
court followed the proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines when it estimated the tax
loss caused by the defendant at 20% of total gross income and denied defendant's request
to offset that amount by his alleged estimated business expenses-such actions by the district
court did not amount to "clear error."); See also United States v. Jackson, 95 F. 3d 500, 506
(7"h Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 973, (1996); United States v. Benitez, 92 F. 3d 528,
536 (7"b Cir. 1996); United States v: Carmack, 100 F. 3d 1271, 1276 (7"h Cir. 1996).
37 U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB1.3 (1998).
"[T]he applicability of [Guideline Section lB 1.3(a)(2)] does not depend
upon whether multiple counts are alleged. Thus, in an embezzlement
case, for example, embezzled funds that may not be specified in any count
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defendant stands convicted of any particular criminal conduct, any reasonably
foreseeable actions committed by the defendant or by a co-participant that is
deemed to be in furtherance of the criminal activity will be considered relevant
conduct. 38 Thus, in a tax offense case, the district court is free to examine all3 9of the
evidence proffered by the government in order to determine the "tax loss.
The authority for considering all "relevant conduct" is found at U.S.S.G.
section 1B1.3, which states that the base offense level, specific offense
characteristics, and cross references in Chapter Two shall be determined by
considering
"all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the
defendant, and, in the case of jointly undertaken activity,40 all
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance
of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the
commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that

of conviction are nonetheless included in determining the offense level if

they were part of the same course of conduct or part of the same scheme
or plan as the count of conviction."
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB 1.3, comment (backg'd) (1998). See
also United States v. Ritsema, 31 F. 3d 559, 567 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the "relevant

conduct provision directs a court to sentence a defendant for uncharged conduct germane
to the charge-offense by authorizing it to consider events before, during, and after the
offense conduct"); United States v. Tucker, 20 F. 3d 242,245 (7b Cir. 1994) (explaining that
"conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may
enter into the determination of the applicable guideline range"); United States v. Smith, 5
F. 3d 259, 262 (7" Cir. 1993) (explaining that "no limitation shall be placed on the

information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence.").
38 "The principles and limits of sentencing accountability under [the relevant conduct
guideline] are not always the same as the principles and limits of criminal liability." U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B 1.3, comment. (n.1) (1998).
39United States v. Valenti, 121 F. 3d-327, 333 (7' Cir. 1997).
40"Jointly undertaken criminal activity" is defined as "a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor,

or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as
a conspiracy." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB 1.3, comment. (n. 2)
(1998). In order to qualify as "jointly undertaken," the relevant conduct at issue must be
both "in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity" and "reasonably foreseeable
in connection with that criminal activity." Id.
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offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
responsibility for that offense,41
In addition, relevant conduct includes all acts and omissions that were part of the
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.

2

2. Relevant Conduct and Tax Loss
It is easy to see how the doctrine of relevant conduct is applied to tax cases.
For example, in United States v. Noske,43 several individuals, including James L.
Noske, a law school graduate, and his sister, Joan M. Noske, an accountant,
operated a business whereby they assisted individuals, who owed the IRS unpaid
tax, disguise their income and assets through a scheme involving the use of sham
non-profit corporations.' The defendants had their clients transfer their assets and
other property to the dummy corporations in order to keep the IRS away. 5
However, the clients retained full control over their income and property .46
The defendants were charged and convicted of conspiracy to defraud the
IRS with respect to three separate individuals' tax situations. 7 However, the
defendants were also involved in many other similar transactions involving other
taxpayers and using the same artifice to hide income and assets. 8
Although the counts of conviction only involved conduct centering around
the three separate taxpayers, the district court took into account information
concerning uncharged conduct, provided by the IRS, whereby other taxpayers
utilized the defendants' fraud scheme in order to evade the payment of tax owed to
the government. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the inclusion of this uncharged
conduct as consistent with the relevant conduct provisions found at Section 1B 1.3,
stating that "the district court also properly included for uncharged relevant criminal
conduct the amounts of tax, computed from IRS files, evaded by [other] clients..
.49

41

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a) (1998).

42 id.
41 117

"id.

F. 3d 1053 (8h Cir. 1997).

45

id.
46 Id.
41Id.

at 1056-57.

48 Id.

49

Noske, 117 F. 3d at 1060.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

11

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 15 [2000], Art. 1

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Meek.50
In Meek, the defendant was convicted of failure to pay required federal income tax
and failure to file income tax returns for 1987 and 1988. At sentencing, the district
court based its guideline calculations on the actual tax avoided for the two years at
issue in the indictment. In addition, it included in its computation an approximation
of unpaid income tax for tax years 1984, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1990, and 1991, by
calculating 28% of gross income for those years. The other years were not included
in the indictment. 5'
The defendant contested the district court's method of calculating the tax
loss. He argued that the district court should not have included any loss for tax
years that were not presented in the indictment, nor should it have included tax loss
involving a time period for which he was not convicted.52
The Court of Appeals disagreed. "The aggregation determination is
addressed by [Sentencing Guideline] section 3D 1.2, which requires aggregation of
all counts of conviction involving substantially the same harm, and [Sentencing
Guideline] section lB 1.3, which requires aggregation of all 'relevant conduct' when
determining a defendant's base offense level."53 Even though the defendant was not
charged for the other years in question, the 'relevant conduct' guideline at section
lB 1.3(a)(2) directs the sentencing court to consider all acts... or omissions that
were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense
of conviction,, 54 regardless of whether the defendant stands convicted of such
conduct, and irrespective of whether it had even been charged in the first place.
As a second matter, the Court of Appeals found that the failure to file
income tax returns resulting in tax loss to the government for the uncharged years
was properly considered relevant conduct because the failure to file was "the same
course of conduct" as contemplated by the "relevant conduct" guideline.56 The
government may establish that tax loss for the uncharged years is the result of the
"same course of conduct" in either of two ways.

'0 998 F. 2d 776 (10' Cir. 1993).
"'
Id. at 776-778.
52 Id. at 781.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 781, quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (1998).
" Id. at 781, citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n. 2) (1998) and § 1B1.3, comment.
(backg'd) (1998).
56 Meek, 998 F. 2d at 782.
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First, it may demonstrate by direct evidence that the defendant engaged in
' For example, a defendant who fails to file
a "continuing pattern of tax violations. 57
tax returns for five consecutive years without fail clearly demonstrates a
"continuing pattern" of behavior such that a conviction of any one tax year in
question, may result in the proper consideration of the other four years in the
determination of tax loss for sentencing. If the government demonstrates these
facts, a conclusive presumption is raised that establishes the tax loss for relevant
conduct purposes.
Where direct evidence is lacking or unavailable, the government may
alternatively demonstrate a "continuing pattern" by indirect methods. If the
government opts for this latter method of proof, the government advances the
position that all of the conduct in the aggregate amounts to tax code violations. 8
However, this only raises a rebuttable presumption of relatedness for relevant
conduct purposes,5 9 allowing the defendant to overcome the presumption by
"coming forward with evidence that his non-charged conduct was clearly unrelated
to his conviction." 6
In the Meek case, the Court of Appeals noted that the government
demonstrated the tax loss for the collateral years resulted from the same course of
conduct through direct methods of proof because the defendant's tax violations
involving failure to file returns dated back as far as 1976 and were consistent with
the behavior with respect to the years of conviction. 6' As such, the uncharged tax
loss for the collateral years in question were properly considered by the district
court as relevant conduct to the offenses of conviction for purposes of guideline
computations and sentence enhancement.62

57

d.

58

id.

59

id.

6 Id.
61
62

Meek, 998 F.2d at 782.
The Meek court distinguished the facts of its case with those in United States v. Daniel,

infra. In Daniel,the Sixth Circuit held that any conduct that merely violates civil provisions
of the tax code may not be used to enhance a sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2T.l. Only
"relevant criminal conduct underlying the charged offense" may be used for determination
of the base offense level under §2T1.1. Daniel, 956 F. 2d at 944. However, the Meek court
noted that Daniel turned on the government's failure to prove that any of the uncharged
conduct at issue in that case violated anything but various civil provisions of the tax code.
Meek, 998 F.2d at 783. Accordingly, such conduct could not be used as "relevant conduct"
for calculating the base offense level. Id.
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Even acquitted conduct may be used to enhance the sentence under the
guise of relevant conduct, as long as the government establishes its existence by a
preponderance of the evidence. 63 Any conduct that forms the basis of a separate
and related charge to which a jury acquitted a defendant may still be used to
64
enhance the sentence with respect to the count of conviction.
3. The Danger of Using Relevant Conduct in Tax Cases
There is credence and logic in most of the principles and methods
promulgated by the court in its analysis of "tax loss." However, the court's
extensive definition of relevant conduct raises troubling fairness and justice issues
that are not easily dismissed.
As noted above, the courts have concluded that for guideline calculation
and sentencing purposes, "relevant conduct" includes uncharged conduct, acquitted
conduct, and conduct which falls outside the applicable statute of limitations period.
Application Note No. I toU.S.S.G. section 1B 1.3 acknowledges that the guidelines
differentiate between sentencing accountability and criminal liability. Thus, the
guidelines hold the defendant responsible not only for the acts committed in the
offense of conviction, but other conduct "relevant" to that offense.65
Because the government determines the counts on which to indict the
defendant, this procedure raises fairness concerns. The government is likely, it is
argued, to choose the strongest counts for indictment, and after obtaining a verdict
or plea, advocate to the probation office and the court that uncharged conduct
should be considered at sentencing. In this manner, the government avoids an
63

See United States v. Barakat, 130 F. 3d 1448, 1452 (11t' Cir. 1997). See also United

States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, (1997), reh'g denied, 519 U.S. 1144, (1997). The United

States Supreme Court held that the inclusion of acquitted conduct in the sentencing
computation formula with respect to the counts of conviction does not raise due process or
double jeopardy concerns. Id. The court relied, in part, on the broadly worded language of
18 U.S.C. § 3661 and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, and § 1B 1.4, which directs sentencing courts to
consider a variety of information, including the background, character, and conduct of the
defendant, regardless of whether the particular conduct had been originally charged and
irrespective of whether a conviction had been obtained. Id. However, in some cases, the
government may have the burden of demonstrating the acquitted conduct by a "clear and
convincing standard" where the "sentencing factor has an extremely disproportionate effect
on the sentence relative to the offense of conviction." United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d
824, 833 (1999).
64
See Id. at 1452.
65
U.5. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B 1.3, comment (N. 1) (1998).
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acquittal on the weaker charges and impedes the defendant from having the charges
heard by ajury. Further, the burden of proof for sentencing purposes is much lower
than the burden at trial.
Although these concerns have some merit, the current procedure does not
appear to promote an unfair sentencing outcome. First, under the pre-guideline
schema, the court could consider uncharged conduct in its sentence
determinations.66 Thus, the guidelines do not give the court any power that it did
not already possess. Second, the government must prove the facts supporting the
conduct by a preponderance of the evidence. While this is certainly a less stringent
standard than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard imposed at trial, it certainly
places a burden on the government to support its contention that certain acts
constitute "relevant conduct" for sentencing purposes. And, as noted above, courts
pre-guidelines had the ability to consider this same conduct with the same standard
of proof. Third, the government is not really unrestrained in its sentencing
presentation to the probation office and the court. The government must always
limit the facts it presents to "relevant conduct." For tax offenses, this means the tax
loss must be part of the "same course of conduct" as the offense of conviction,
usually evidencing
that the defendant engaged in a "continuing pattern of tax
67
,
violations.
A further benefit of permitting the court to consider uncharged conduct in
its sentencing determination is the conservation of judicial resources. If the court
could not consider uncharged conduct, in most cases, the government would file an
all-encompassing indictment. If a case went to trial, valuable court and jury time
would be spent on the presentation of evidence concerning 6these additional counts,
which essentially represent "the same course of conduct., 1
However, under the Sentencing Guidelines, the government can avoid
wasting judicial resources and time by simply prosecuting examples of the conduct.
After conviction and plea, the government can then request that the court consider
for sentencing purposes the full range of related activity. This procedure shortens
the length of the trial and conserves judicial resources. Further, the defendant is not
treated unfairly because he still has an opportunity to contest the alleged relevant

"[T]he pre-guidelines sentencing system was, in a sense, [a real offense] system.. The
sentencing court and the parole commission took account of the conduct in which the
defendant actually engaged." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1, comment.
(backg'd.) (1998).
67 See supra text accompanying notes 57 through 60.
68 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB 1.3(a)(1)(B)(2) (1998).
66
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conduct in his response to the Presentence Report69 and again at the sentencing
hearing.7 °
A related, but much more controversial issue, is the court's consideration
of acquitted conduct. In this type of case, the government charges the conduct, but
is then unable to meet its burden at trial. Yet, the government presents the facts
underlying the acquitted conduct to the probation office and the court, and seeks a
sentence that considers this conduct.
At first glance, consideration of this conduct appears extremely unfair.
However, upon further analysis, it appears consistent with the principles enunciated
above. Inclusion of acquitted conduct at the sentencing phase is logically proper
because, as the Supreme Court held in UnitedStates v. Watts,7'ajury cannot be said
to have necessarily rejected any facts when it returns a general verdict of not guilty.
An acquittal only demonstrates that the government was unable to prove its case
beyond any reasonable doubt. However, sentencing facts need only be established
by a preponderance of the evidence.72
Thus, as for uncharged conduct, it is consistent with pre-guidelines
sentencing practice to factor into the equation all applicable acquitted conduct.
Once again, the government is not entirely unrestrained because it must show that
the conduct is indeed "relevant" to the offense of conviction.73

"Within 14 days after receiving the presentence report, the parties shall communicate in
writing to the probation officer, and to each other, any objections to any material
information, sentencing classifications, sentencing guideline ranges, and policy statements
contained in or omitted from the presentence report." FED. R.CRIM. P. 32(b)(6)(B).
70 "For good cause shown, the court may allow a new objection to be raised at any time
before imposing sentence." FED. R. CRIM P. 32(b)(6)(D).
7'519 U.S. 148 (1997). "tA] jury's verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court
from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 157.
72 "The [Sentencing] Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the evidence
standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving
disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts of a case." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A 1.3 (1998), comment. Although most information and evidence
may be considered by the sentencing court, only such information having "sufficient indicia
of reliability to support its probable accuracy" may be taken into account. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (1998). See also United States v. Marshall, 519 F. Supp.
751 (E.D. Wis. 1981), aff'd, 719 F. 2d 887 (7 thCir. 1983); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.
2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
73 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3(a) (1998).
69
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Further, the fact that there are different standards of proof at trial and
sentencing places the defendant on notice that if he should be convicted on any
count of the charging instrument, the court may find that related conduct, even
acquitted conduct, has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and will be
considered in the court's determination of the appropriate sentencing range.74
Simply stated, the basic question in terms of uncharged and acquitted conduct
becomes whether or not the standard of proof for sentencing purposes differ from
the standard used at trial.
D. Double Jeopardy Concerns
Defendants have raised the issue of whether an IRS civil assessment of
interest and penalties precludes the government from proceeding against the
taxpayer as a possible violation of the Fifth Amendment. If the government has
already "penalized" the defendant by assessing and/or collecting fines or penalties
for the defendant's failure to remit income tax, then perhaps the government has
renounced its ability to proceed against him through criminal prosecutions.

74

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 6A. 1.3 (1998), Comment.
amend. V provides,
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "
Id. The courts have reached similar results in other substantive areas as well. See, e.g.,
United States v. Price, 914 F. 2d 1507 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding no double jeopardy issue
exists where government invokes civil forfeiture provisions under Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act following the disposition of related criminal portion of
case because forfeiture involves civil action); Manocchio v. Kusserow, 961 F. 2d 1539 (11 th
Cir. 1992) (explaining that no double jeopardy violation occurred where Florida physician
is excluded from accepting Medicare reimbursements for five years and stands criminally
convicted of Medicare fraud because the debarment was a civil action meant to remedy the
government of harm inflicted by defendant rather than to impose punishment); UrbinaMauricio v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 989 F. 2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that an illegal immigrant ordered deported and convicted of narcotics trafficking crimes did
not constitute double jeopardy within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment because the
deportation order is a civil action and does not constitute punishment); United States v.
$145,139, U.S. Currency (noting that no double jeopardy concerns exist where criminal
defendant convicted of illegally smuggling United States currency and travelers checks out
of the United States following government's seizure of the monetary instruments because
the seizure and ultimate forfeiture was remedial in nature).
'5 U.S. CONST.
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In Noske,76 the defendants raised the argument that a prosecution for tax
fraud is precluded when the IRS has already assessed civil tax fines in an amount
of 100% of income derived from the illegal activity.77 In their situation, since the
IRS implemented such a penalty, they argued that the government could not
thereafter prosecute them criminally for tax evasion or tax fraud.
The district court disagreed with the defendants and ruled accordingly. On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The defendants
were not penalized by the imposition of the 26 U.S.C. § 6700 penalties because the
penalties are "remedial rather than punitive in nature."7" According to the Court,
the defendants were "assessed a penalty of $ 490,174, representing 20% of the
income derived from their abusive activity. 79
Such a penalty is not
"overwhelmingly disproportionate" to the harm they inflicted upon the government
as a result of the criminal tax scheme.80 "Although no final tally has been
calculated, the district court found the Government had incurred 'obviously
substantial' costs and 'significant expenses' because of the defendants' behavior,
including lost tax revenue and costs of investigation and prosecution over a ten-year
'8
period. " '
As such, the IRS's imposition of civil penalties is not more than what could
be considered as "compensation for the Government's damages. '82 The penalties
were "remedial" or restitutional in nature in that the provisions sought to reimburse
the government for its "significant expenses" associated with "lost tax revenue" and
"costs of investigation." 83 Consequently, provided the purpose of the civil action
is not punitive, the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment is not
triggered.

76 117 F. 3dat 1056.

"' Id. The defendants argue that the government's case with respect to the conspiracy
charges amounts to a violation of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause because
the government previously assessed civil penalties on the unreported and unpaid tax. Id. See
also 26 U.S.C. § 6700 (1999) (creating a penalty of the greater of either $1000 or 100% of
all
money realized from the illegal activity).
78
id.

79Id.

at 1057.
'oId. at 1057. See also United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 439, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487, 109
S. Ct. 1892 (1989) (holding that a penalty exceeding 220 times that of the actual loss to the
government may be deemed double punishment for purposes of the Fifth Amendment).
81

Id.

82

Noske, 117 F. 3d at 1057.

83 Id.

at 1056-1057.
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E. Accrued Interest
When the Sentencing Commission originally established the guidelines in
November 1, 1987, accrued interest was included as part of the determination of
tax loss.84 When making the tax loss assessment, the sentencing court had to review
each tax year at issue for purposes of determining accrued interest. The Sentencing
Commission feared this would lead to governmental abuse (such as delaying
indictment in order to increase accrued interest and manipulation of sentencing
factors) and complications at sentencing (the IRS changes interest rates each year,
thus requiring multiple computational analyses for purposes of determining accrued
interest)., 5 Therefore, effective November 1, 1989, the Sentencing Commission
eliminated the inclusion of interest for this purpose. It also elected to exclude any
IRS added civil or statutory penalties .86

84

As originally established, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Tl.l(a)

defined tax loss as "the greater of (A) the total amount of tax that the taxpayer evaded or
attempted to evade, including interest to the date offiling an indictment..." HUTCHISON,
supra
note 8, at 680.
85
T. HUTCHISON, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE at 5 89 (West 1997).
However,
at least one court commented (prior to the enactment of Section 2T1.1, application note 1)
that including interest as part of tax loss is within the Sentencing Commission's power under
18 U.S.C. § 994 (f) and would not lead to governmental abuse. "Including interest in
computing tax loss merely recognizes the time value of money. Far from being beyond the
[Sentencing] Commission's authority, it is a rational calculation of the real loss sustained
as a consequence of the taxpayer's illegally concealing his income from assessment."
United States v. McLaughlin, 126 F. 3d 130 (3d Cir. 1997) (reviewing a tax offense that
occurred and a sentence imposed prior to the enactment of U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Tl.1, comment. (n. 1)). "[I]t is always within the taxpayer's
power to pay the deficiency and to stop interest from accruing." Id. at 139.
However, assuming such an approach were taken, a defendant who has the present ability
to pay the deficiency could reduce the subsequent tax loss and, therefore, have an impact on
the ultimate sentence he receives. A tax offender who has the resources to pay a deficiency,
the amount of which is used to determine the tax loss for purposes of assessing the guideline
imprisonment range, could successfully reduce the amount of prison time to be served. On
the other hand, an individual lacking the financial resources would not be able to mitigate
the loss, thus incurring potentially a higher offense level and imprisonment range. The
ability to reduce one's time in custody through subsequent remedial measures (such as
repaying tax loss) is discouraged under the Sentencing Guidelines and offends traditional
notions of financial infirmities causing lengthened prison terms. For example, U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(c)(5) (1998) states that the "tax loss is
not reduced by any payment of the tax subsequent to the commission of the offense."
86
Id. See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Tl.1, comment (n.1)
(1998) (reiterating that "[t]he tax loss does not include interest or penalties."). See also,

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

19

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 15 [2000], Art. 1

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

1. Actual vs. Intended Loss
Courts often face the situation where a defendant intends to evade tax, but
fails to successfully complete the crime prior to its discovery. For example, a
defendant may falsify an individual income tax return by underreporting income
and seeking an income tax refund, only to be caught immediately before the IRS
issues the check. The government may not have suffered an actual tax loss, but
clearly the defendant intended to inflict it. Should the court consider this amount
as tax loss for sentencing guideline purposes?
The Sentencing Commission clearly intended that such desired loss be used
as part of the offense level computations. "[T]he court should use any method of
determining the tax loss that appears appropriate to reasonably calculate the loss
that would have resulted had the offense been successfully completed."87 The fact
that a defendant's attempt to inflict loss has been thwarted should not impact upon
the sentencing calculations.
The Sentencing Guidelines have followed this approach for offenses falling
under Chapter Two, Part F of the Sentencing Guidelines (offenses involving fraud
or deceit). Application Note 8 to Section 2F1.1 states,
"[i]f an intended loss that the defendant was attempting to inflict
can be determined, this figure will be used if it is greater than the
actual loss.... For example, if the fraud consisted of selling or
attempting to sell $40,000 in worthless securities, or representing
that a forged check for $40,000 was genuine, the loss would be
$40,000."8
In this regard, it appears that the Sentencing Commission intended that any intended
loss that the tax offender attempted to inflict should be considered as part of the
"tax loss" for purposes of offense level computations.
F. The Double Loss Problem-Corporateand PersonalIncome Tax Loss
In some situations, a single act such as the failure to claim a single source
of income may give rise to both personal and corporate income tax loss. For

Hopper, 177 F.3d at 831-32 (explaining that the calculation of tax loss does not include
"penalties and fees into the amount of loss for sentencing").
87 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1, comment. (n. 1) (1998).
8 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Fl, comment. (n.8) (1998).
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example, a situation may occur where the dominant (or sole) shareholder of an IRS
Subchapter "C" Corporation receives income through the business and diverts it for
his own use. He has, therefore, issued a dividend and failed to account for it. Thus,
the income is not reported (and the tax not paid) on either the corporate or
individual income tax returns.8 9 Should a sentencing court consider the compound
nature of the harm when computing the offense level and "tax loss" under the
guidelines for purposes of determining the defendant's imprisonment range?
The Seventh Circuit first addressed this issue in United States v. Harvey.90
In Harvey, the defendant was the principal in a closely held Internal Revenue Code
Subchapter C corporation, which distributed scrap aluminum. The defendant sold
scrap aluminum and received over $81,000 without properly accounting for it. He
did not report the sale of this scrap on either his individual or corporate income tax
returns for the relevant taxable years.
Although only one defendant inflicted the tax loss on the government, there
were two taxpayers involved in the crime. Both Harvey and the corporation that he
controlled had obligations to pay income tax on the $81,000 sale of aluminum. By
failing to properly report and pay the income tax involved, Harvey inflicted this
"double tax" loss on the government. But, is it fair to hold Harvey criminally
culpable (for guideline imprisonment purposes) for the entire amount of tax loss?
If so, the sentencing court must figure 28% of the $81,000 for individual tax
purposes and 34% for corporate tax purposes, resulting in a net tax loss for
guideline purposes of 62%. Such a difference would change his base offense level
from 11 to 13, which may translate into as much as four additional months in
custody. 91
The Harvey court seems to follow this logic. In doing so, it focuses on
application note 3 to section 2T1.1, stating that "all conduct which violates the tax
laws..." should be considered. It inferred the intent of the Sentencing Commission
as wanting the sentencing court to consider all of the tax harm caused by the

A corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its officers, directors, and
shareholders, and has an independent obligation to pay income tax on corporate profits.
Therefore, this creates the "double-tax" effect, taxing profits at the corporate level and a
second time at the individual shareholder level. See, e.g. United States v. Mews, 923 F. 2d
67 (7" Cir. 1991).
89

90 996 F. 2d 919 (7h Cir. 1993).
91

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2000

MANUAL

§ 2T4.1 (1998).

21

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 15 [2000], Art. 1

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

defendant. As such, the tax loss resulting from both the personal income tax return
and the corporate income tax return should be considered.92
However, the method for computing the tax loss is not 62% of the total
amount of unreported income (that is, 28% individual plus 34% corporate, yielding
62%). Doing so actually misstates the actual tax loss to the government.9 3 For
example, in the Harvey case, the corporation should have theoretically paid 34% of
$81,000, or $27,540 corporate income tax. The tax would have been deducted from
the $81,000, leaving $53,460 for distribution to Harvey. From that amount, Harvey
should have paid 28% tax on the distribution, or $14,969. Therefore, the total
aggregate tax loss to the government was $42,509 (not $50,220 based upon 62% as
aggregate corporate and individual tax rates). The sentencing court must deduct the
corporation's income tax liability out of the equation prior to computing the
individual income tax liability.94
Following Harvey, the Sentencing Commission added commentary to
clarify its intent: "if the offense involves both individual and corporate tax returns,
the tax loss is the aggregate tax loss from the offenses taken together."95 The
Commission effectively follows the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Harvey.
However, the commentary does not set forth the proper mechanism for computing
the "aggregate tax loss. ''9 6 It therefore appears safe to conclude that the method set
forth in Harvey survives this guideline amendment.
The Seventh Circuit had occasion to revisit this issue in United States v.
Bhagavan.97 In Bhagavan, the Court of Appeals described the Harvey test using a
three-part methodology: "(1) apply the corporate rate of 34% to the unreported
profit, which produces the amount of lost corporate taxes; (2) reduce the imputed
dividend by the amount of the imputed corporate taxes; (3) apply the personal rate
of 28% to the reduced dividend to determine the amount of lost personal taxes. 9 8
This method assumes that the unreported income is an "imputed dividend" from the
corporation to the individual taxpayer. 99 The failure to report this dividend occurs

92 "When a single transaction bypasses both corporate and personal taxes, any effort to
determine the tax loss must include both." Harvey, 996 F. 3d at 920.
93
Id. at 921.
94 Id.
95 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §2Tl.1, comment. (n. 7) (1998).
96

Id.

97116
98Id.

F. 3d 189 (7' Cir. 1997).

at 192.

99 Id.
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as a single act, but has the consequence of tax loss at both the individual and
corporate levels.
However, the Harvey rationale has its limits. The method used by the
Harvey court is premised upon the defendant having committed one act that gives
rise to both corporate and individual tax liability and that the money that the
taxpayer clandestinely reaped from the corporation would otherwise have been a
dividend, reduced by the total amount of tax that the corporation would have paid
on net income. 1°°
In United States v. Cseplo,'' the sentencing court refused to follow the
Harvey methodology. The defendant was the sole officer, director, and shareholder
of Kimco Products, Inc., a corporation engaged in the production of stainless steel
products. Over several years, the defendant diverted over $250,000 in receipts from
the corporation to his personal use. The defendant failed to report this amount on
the corporate income tax returns, and he failed to report over $195,000 of the above
amount on his individual income tax returns for the tax years in question. 0 2 In
calculating his sentence, the district court computed 34 percent of $250,000,
representing the corporate income tax loss, and 28 percent of $195,000,
representing the individual income tax loss. The defendant argued that the court
should not have aggregated these two figures.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's method in
this situation. It took a very narrow reading of Harvey in that it refused to
recognize the tax evaded with respect to the corporate and the individual income tax
returns as being sufficiently related.
"[Cseplo] pleaded guilty not to having committed a single crime,
but to having committed two separate crimes. One offense,
involving a corporate tax return, was committed in May of 1990,
and the other, involving an individual tax return, was committed
five months later. The guidelines are very specific about the
necessity of aggregating the tax losses, and we see no justification
0 3
for proceeding as if only one crime had been committed."1

'0o United States v. Cseplo, 42 F. 3d 360 (6" Cir. 1994).
101Id.

1' Id. at 361.
1'0 Id. at 364.
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Another issue with respect to addressing the double tax penalty involves the
characterization of income as personal, corporate, or both. Because of the double
penalty for tax loss characterized as both corporate and personal, defendants have
incentive to attempt to have it perceived by the sentencing courts as personal tax
loss. This issue arose in Bhagavan."°4 In Bhagavan, the defendant was the
president, chief operating officer, and controlling shareholder of a closely-held
Indiana corporation organized for the purpose of performing engineering and
surveying work.105 The defendant had the corporation's clients pay him directly for
work performed by the corporation. These clients believed that they were dealing
with the corporation, not with the defendant directly.' °6 Not only did he divert
payments to his own personal benefit, he also received "secret stock dividends" in
varying amounts over the course of the taxable years at issue.10 7 He failed to report
08

these payments on either the corporate or personal income tax returns.

Although the defendant pleaded guilty to only one count of income tax
fraud involving the non-payment of personal income tax, all of the monies he
diverted from clients or received directly from the corporation were at issue during
his sentencing hearing.'0 9 The government argued that all the monies that the
defendant received from the corporation's clients should be characterized as
corporate income. The defendant, however, argued that the unreported receipts
should be characterized as personal income, because he performed these services
as a private consultant." 0
The district court characterized these receipts as corporate income, thus
subjecting them to the double tax computation."' The clients received their bills
on the corporation's invoices." 2 Moreover, when they remitted payment to the
defendant, they did so based upon the instructions that he gave, leading them to
believe that they were receiving credits or discounts from their total bills. 113 They
never issued 1099's to the defendant, even though the amounts they paid each

'04

116 F. 3d at 189.

1'oId. at 190.
10 6 Id. at 191.
107 id.
108 id.

109 See supra notes 37-74 and accompanying text for discussion of U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B 1.3 (1998) (use of relevant conduct for computation of tax
loss).
110 Bhagavan, 116 F. 3d at 191.
"'

Id.

112

Id. at 192.

113 id.
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totaled over $60014 in any one taxable year,1 15 and the work he performed was
16
precisely the type the corporation was organized to perform.'
Even if the defendant was performing this work in his "spare time," the
appellate court grappled with whether he even legally could have accepted such
work given his standing in the corporation as a chief operating officer. Under
Indiana corporate law, as well as corporate law in the majority of United States
jurisdictions, his performance of services, consistent with those that the corporation
117
performed, would be deemed an illegal usurpation of a corporate opportunity.
As such, it would be impossible as a matter of law for any such monies to be
classified as "personal" in nature. Thus, the district court properly characterized the
diverted monies as corporate in nature. By failing to claim them on the corporate
income tax return, a tax loss resulted. In addition, since he personally gained by
that amount, he should have reported that money on his personal income tax return.
Therefore, a double-tax penalty for purposes of computing tax loss under the
Sentencing Guidelines is proper.
G. Federalvs. State and Local Tax Loss
As discussed above, relevant conduct permits (and in fact requires)
sentencing courts to consider offense behavior collateral to the offense of
conviction, as long as it meets the definition of U.S.S.G. section 1B1.3." 8
However, should non-federal tax loss be included in that computation, such as
offenses that also involve tax loss to state and local jurisdictions?
For example, consider the situation where a defendant fails to report and
submit payroll taxes for his employees. He is indicted and subsequently convicted
of evading federal income tax. However, the same act also gives rise to the failure
to report and pay other taxes, including social security, Medicare, unemployment
insurance, and state and local payroll taxes.

Anyone who pays an independent contractor in excess of $600 in any one taxable year
must file a Form 1099 with the Internal Revenue Service and send a copy to the independent
contractor. 26 U.S.C. § 6041A(a) (1999).
114

115
116

Id.

Bhagavan, 116 F. 3d at 192.

11'Id. For a discussion of usurpation of corporate opportunity, see
BUSINESS LAW AND THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 878

JANE

P.

MALLOR,

(10th ed. 1998).

11'See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in United States v.
Powell." 9 In Powell, the defendant was a wholesale distributor of gasoline and
diesel fuel. Both the federal government and the State of Texas offered a program
that permitted wholesalers to blend mixtures of fuel and resell it. By doing so, both
governments offered wholesalers the ability to purchase the additives at reduced
excise tax rates. However, they were only permitted to benefit from these reduced
rates if they, in fact, mixed the gasoline into the new blended mixture. If a
120
wholesaler failed to mix the gasoline, he could not benefit from the reduced rate.
Powell purchased large quantities of gasoline at the reduced tax rates. He
informed the government entities through the appropriate tax statements that he was
blending fuel. However, he was not doing so for the majority of these reduced tax
rate purchases.
Powell was subsequently named in a five-count federal indictment charging
violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (tax evasion). 12' Ajury convicted him on all counts.
During the sentencing phase, the probation officer based his sentencing
recommendation solely on the amount of federal excise tax evaded, exclusive of the
state tax. The government objected to the probation officer's findings contained in
the Presentence Report. The district court agreed with the government, concluding
that the state tax loss 122 was "relevant conduct" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3.23
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the government's position and expressly
rejected Powell's argument that only federal tax losses may be considered for
purposes of computing the offense level. 124 The state tax loss resulted from the
same "core" of criminal offense behavior25 that gave rise to the federal tax loss and
collateral to the offenses of conviction.
To support this conclusion, the appellate court referred to the mandate of
the guidelines. "The Sentencing Guidelines permit many factors to be taken into

19
124 F. 3d 655 (5" Cir. 1997).
'20 Id.at 657.
121 Id. at 660.
122 The government alleged that Powell violated TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 153.403 (Vernon
1992 & Supp. 1997), providing for criminal penalties for the willful evasion of certain
excise taxes. Id. at 665.
123 Id. at 663.
124 Id. at 664.
125 Powell, 124 F. 3d at 663.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol15/iss1/1

26

Zucker and Carey: Capturing the Harm

2000]

CAPTURING THE HARM

account in determining a sentence," including all relevant conduct. Courts have
held in other federal offenses that purely "state" conduct can be considered as
relevant conduct in the federal offense. 126 Therefore, the amount of state tax loss
may be considered
if it constitutes "relevant conduct" within the meaning of section
27
1B1.3.1
H. Civil Tax Liability
Although Application Note 2 to section 2Tl.1 provides that "all conduct
violating the tax laws" should be included as relevant conduct, "civil" tax liability
may not be considered as part of the criminal case and should not be used for
determination of sentencing offense level.128 In addition, if a sentencing court
decides to award restitution, it may not include such "civil" liability in its restitution
order.
In UnitedStates v. Daniel,12 9 the defendant was convicted of a three-count
indictment each charging violations of 26 U.S.C. §7201 (income tax evasion). At
sentencing, the district court issued, inter alia, a restitution order obligating the
defendant to repay the government over $154,000. The court based its order on the
probation officer's assessment of the income tax, interest, and penalties due to the
government. The probation officer also calculated the income tax, exclusive of
interest and penalties, at just over $40,000.13°
The Sixth Circuit reversed the restitution order of the sentencing court. The
defendant's criminal culpability involved only the evasion of the $40,000, and the
restitution order should not exceed the amount of actual loss inflicted on the victim

126 See, e.g.,

United States v. Armstead, 114 F. 3d 504 (5"' Cir. 1997), cert.denied, 522 U.S.
922, 118 S.Ct. 315, 139 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1997) (explaining that enhancement for committing
a burglary while possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(u) is properly
considered relevant conduct under U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1B 1.3
(1997) for purposes of determining applicability of U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL §2K2.1 (b)(5) (1997)).
127 Powell, 124 F 3d at 664. The appellate court found the state tax loss to constitute
"relevant conduct" within the meaning of U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ lB 1.3, because it was part of a "common scheme or plan" as the federal offenses and
because it constituted the "same course of conduct." Id. at 666. For further discussion on
relevant conduct, see supra notes 37-74 and accompanying text.
128 United States v. Pierce 17 F. 3d 146, 150 (6" Cir. 1994).
129 956 F. 2d 540 (6"' Cir. 1992).
30 Id.
at 543.
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as a result of the commission of the offense.13 1 Moreover, the Court reasoned the
defendant might be able to subsequently invalidate the civil assessment. "It is
theoretically possible that Daniel, after being convicted and serving his sentence,
might then prevail in whole, or in part, in a civil action concerning his civil tax
liability thus reducing the amount owed as alleged by the government.'' 132
However, even though the use of "civil" tax liability may not be used for
purposes of relevant conduct leading to sentencing enhancement or for use of
fashioning a restitution order, the district court may consider any unpaid taxes when
making specific conditions of probation or supervised release, provided that they
have either been reduced to judgment or are not otherwise disputed by the
133
defendant or indeterminate.
L Statute of Limitations
One possible limitation on the use of relevant conduct at sentencing
involves the statute of limitations. For example, a defendant intentionally
underreports his gross income by fifty percent (violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7201) on
his federal income tax returns every year for the last twenty years. The IRS audits
his three most recent years' tax returns and discovers the fraud. He is referred to the
Criminal Investigations Division who then refers the matter to the United States
Attorney for prosecution.
13 4
The statute of limitations for a violation of 26 U.S.C.§ 7201 is five years.
Accordingly, the Assistant United States Attorney seeks a grand jury indictment for
those seven years alone, temporarily ignoring the remaining thirteen years that
proceeded them. The grand jury returns a seven-count indictment, and the
defendant eventually pleads guilty to one or more of those counts.

The case next enters the sentencing phase. A probation officer is assigned
to prepare a presentence report and sentencing recommendation, which includes a

31
' 1d.,

citing Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, (1990) (stating that "loss caused by the
conduct underlying the offense of conviction establishes the outer limit of a restitution
order.")
132 Id. at 544.
th
'33 United States v. Hatchett 918 F. 2d 631, 644 (6 Cir. 1990). See also United States v.
Taylor, 305 F. 2d 183, 188 (4b Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894, 83 S. Ct. 193,9 L. Ed.
2d 126 (1962); United States v. McMichael, 699 F. 2d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Vaughn, 636 F. 2d 921 (4t' Cir. 1980).
134 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1999).
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computation and analysis of the relevant guideline sentencing factors. 135 The
Assistant United States Attorney presents the probation officer with evidence of the
five years of tax loss alleged in the indictment, as well as the earlier thirteen years
of tax loss following the expiration of the statute of limitations. Does due process
permit the probation officer (and the district court) to consider the earlier thirteen
years of tax loss as relevant conduct for purposes of sentencing enhancement?
1. Prevailing View
The Second, 136Fifth, 137 Sixth 38 , Seventh, Tenth 139, Eleventh 4° , and District
of Columbia Circuits have followed the approach that permits relevant conduct
occurring prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations to be used for purposes
of computing tax lOSS.' 4 However, the Seventh Circuit case, United States v.
Valenti,142 is a good illustration of this approach.
In Valenti, the defendant was convicted following a jury trial of several
counts of tax evasion and failure to file tax returns for tax years 1988 through 1993.
The defendant owned and operated a carpentry business. He did not keep any
records whatsoever. He did not maintain a regular checking or savings account,
insisted on paying all business expenses (including his employees' salaries) with
cash, and cashed any checks he received at a local bank. The defendant failed to
file tax returns, issue W-2 or 1099 forms to his employees, withhold payroll taxes,
and, most importantly, failed to pay tax to the IRS. 43
At sentencing, the district court considered, inter alia, relevant conduct
constituting tax loss for the years for which the statute of limitations had previously
expired. The defendant argued that the government could not have prosecuted him
for taxable years 1986 and 1987 because of the expiration of the statute of
limitations. The district court refused to follow the defendant's approach and

3 FED. R. CRIM.

P. 32(b).

United States v. Silkowski, 32 F. 3d 682, 687 (2nd Cir. 1994).
17 United States v. Lokey, 945 F. 2d 825, 840 (5th Cir. 1991).
138 United States v. Pierce, 17 F. 3d 146, 150 (6" Cir. 1994).
139 United States v. Neighbors, 23 F. 3d 306, 311 (10"' Cir. 1994).
40 United States v. Behr, 93 F. 3d 764, 765 (11" Cir. 1996).
141 United States v. Wishnefsky, 7 F. 3d 254, 256-67 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
142 121 F. 3d 327 (7" Cir. 1997).
"43 Id. at 328-29.
136
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nevertheless included the gross income that he failed to report for those years as
relevant conduct to further enhance his sentence. 44
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's approach. "A criminal
defendant is entitled to due process at sentencing; it is clear, however, that due
process does not extend so far as to grant him full trial rights with regard to other
crimes he has committed.' 141 In other words, the fact that the expired criminal
conduct could not independently give rise to a prosecution for tax fraud alone does
not prevent a sentencing court from treating that expired conduct as an
enhancement to the crime for the unexpired conduct. Such use of the expired
conduct does not amount to a violation of the defendant's due process rights for
purposes of guideline computations and utilization at sentencing.
The Second Circuit reaches the same conclusion as the Seventh Circuit, but
traces the authority for its approach to the guidelines themselves. In UnitedStates
v. Silkowski, 146 the defendant pleaded guilty to a single-count information charging
him with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (theft of public funds). Specifically, the
defendant was alleged to have illegally received social security disability benefits
for a twelve-year period, from May 1979 until May 1991.147 In the Presentence
Report, the probation officer calculated the loss beginning November 1980 as the
first date of relevant conduct. 148 The defendant filed an objection to the Presentence
Report, arguing against the inclusion of loss incurred after the five-year statute of
limitations period in the determination of any sentencing factor, including offense
level computations and restitution amounts. The sentencing court overruled his
objections and followed the loss computations of the probation officer.' 49 It
offense level using the loss amount and ordered restitution
therefore increased his
150
amount.
full
for the
The Second Circuit split on this issue. With respect to using the loss prior
to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the appellate court agreed with the
sentencing court's decision to include the full loss as relevant conduct for use in
determining his offense level and imprisonment range. 15 "Statute of limitations

'"Id.at 334.
'Id. (citing United States v. Radix Lab., Inc. 963 F. 2d 1034, 1039 (7" Cir. 1992)).
nd
Cir. 1994).
'4632F. 3d 682 (2
147
Id. at 684.
148 Id. at 686.
149 Id.
150Id.

51Id.

at 687.
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jurisprudence does not alter [the relevant conduct analysis] when determining
length of incarceration. The Guidelines expressly provide for consideration
'without limitation, [of] any information concerning the background, character and
conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. ' "5 2 Given this
instruction from the Sentencing Commission, the relevant conduct provisions have
been construed broadly. 5 ' Therefore, the5inclusion
of this pre-statute of limitations
4
proper.
was
court
sentencing
the
loss by
On the other hand, the Second Circuit did not believe that the sentencing
court should have included any loss that occurred after the expiration of the statute
of limitations for purposes of restitution. This distinction materializes due to the
differing authorities for imprisonment range and restitution orders. For purposes
of restitution, the court makes its decision of whether to issue a restitution order
pursuant to the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, not from the Sentencing
Guidelines. 155 As such, the issue does not center on156
whether relevant conduct may
include the statute of limitations' expired conduct.
2. Proposal for Alternative View
The potential for abuse by use of this approach is boundless. Consider the
following scenario: an individual fails to properly disclose all of his income on his
tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201117 in 1990 and again from 1992 through
1995. In 1996, the defendant is audited by the IRS who, in turn, elects to pursue the
matter through the criminal system. The Assistant United States Attorney receives

152

Silkowski, 32 F.3d at 687-88, citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §

1BA.4.
153
See, e.g., United States v. Concepcion, 983 F. 2d 369, 387 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. denied
sub. nom. Frias v. United States 510 U.S. 856 (1993).
154

Silkowski, 32 F. 3d at 688.

155

Id.

If the tax offense is charged under title 26 of the United States Code, restitution is
generally not applicable, absent an agreement to the contrary by the parties. See United
'd Cir. 1997); See also 18 U.S.C. §§3663-3664.
States v. Gottesman, 122 F. 3d 150, 151 (2
156

15726

U.S.C. § 7201 (1999) provides,

"Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction
thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of
a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution."
26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1999).
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information from the IRS that evidences the failure to file returns for the five years
in question. For 1990, the defendant failed to report $100,000 of income. For each
of years 1992 through 1995, the defendant failed to report $10,000 of income.
By 1996, the statute of limitations expired for proceeding against the
defendant for the 1990 unreported and unpaid tax. Nevertheless, the government
need only seek an indictment against the defendant for the recent three years. At
trial, the government need only prove that the defendant willfully failed to report
income for those same years. However, if convicted, the government may elect to
present the probation officer with evidence pertaining to unreported income for the
1990 tax year. Even though the government may never have presented such
information to the jury for purposes of seeking a conviction, the sentencing court
must consider the tax loss for 1990 tax year for purposes of substantially enhancing
158
his sentence.
For the reasons that follow, the authors propose that the Sentencing
Commission amend the guidelines to preclude the consideration of tax loss
occurring prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
There are four primary reasons for having a statute of limitations in federal
criminal tax cases: (1) fair opportunity for defense; (2) prevent undue delay in
bringing charges; (3) suppress stale charges; and (4) ensure preservation of
evidence. For these reasons, the government should not have the ability to seek
indictment against an individual for such conduct. Nonetheless, the Circuits have
permitted the consideration of conduct outside the statute of limitations in their
sentencing determinations, 159 notwithstanding the fact that the defendant's
opportunity and ability to meaningfully challenge the validity of the government's
presentation may no longer be available.
The purposes of having a statute of limitations discussed above strongly
militate against allowing this tax loss to be considered for guideline purposes. The
government cannot prosecute such conduct because it falls outside of the applicable
statute of limitations period and is precluded from bringing charges prior to trial.
Under these circumstances, the government actually fails to meet a jurisdictional

"When a sentencing factor has an extremely disproportionate effect on the sentence
relative to the offense of conviction,' [however,] the government may have to satisfy a 'clear
and convincing' standard." United States v. Romero-Rendon, 198 F.3d 745, 747 (9h Cir.
1999)(citing Hopper, 177 F.3d at 833).
159 See supra notes 137-142.
158,,
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requirement. Unlike uncharged and acquitted conduct,' 60 the government could not
bring an action charging this conduct, and the trial court could not entertain an
action involving this conduct because it falls outside the statute of limitations. As
the rule now stands, the government has an inroad around a jurisdictional
requirement, something that is seriously suspect.
Defendants are therefore subject to punishment for conduct that they may
no longer have the ability to refute. What is particularly troubling about this
concept is that the potential consequences go beyond the payment of back taxes,
penalties or interest. The "tacking on" of this tax loss for sentencing purposes
usually translates into a longer and harsher custody sentence for the defendant. The
idea of statute of limitations therefore becomes meaningless.
III. CONCLUSION

The Sentencing Guidelines use the concept of tax loss as the basis for
imposing a sentence upon the tax offender, as it is the "driving force" behind the
severity of the sentence that the tax offender will receive. Tax loss has been
interpreted quite broadly by the courts in order to effectuate the Sentencing
Commission's intent to "protect the public interest in preserving the integrity" of
the tax system, punish the taxpayer, deter others from doing the same, and to
"promote respect" for the United States' tax laws.' 6 ' It remains to be seen as to
whether the empirical evidence supports the Commission's goals in this area.

"6
See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
61
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1 (intro. comment) (1998).
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